By Mari Hansen 
Between the tip of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa is a stretch of water that is only sixteen miles wide. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait was difficult for most people to locate on a map. However, the naval commanders, shipping executives, and insurance underwriters who watched it for the majority of 2024 know exactly what happens when the Houthis stop talking. It does not imply that it is finished. It indicates that they are holding out.
There has been a false calm over the last few months. The Suez corridor has seen a cautious retreat of commercial ships. Although they haven’t returned to normal, insurance premiums have decreased after reaching crisis levels during the peak of Houthi attacks. Those waters are still patrolled by Western naval task forces.
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Group Name | Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis) |
| Founded | Early 1990s, formally organized as a movement in 2004 |
| Ideological Alignment | Zaydi Shia Islamist; anti-U.S., anti-Israel, pro-Iran |
| Primary Base of Operations | Sanaa, Yemen (capital, held since 2014) |
| Key Leader | Abdul Malik al-Houthi |
| Backed By | Islamic Republic of Iran (weapons, intelligence, training) |
| Red Sea Attacks Launched | Over 33 confirmed attacks on commercial vessels (as of early 2024) |
| Global Trade Impact | Suez Canal traffic dropped 70% by mid-2024 (UN Trade & Development) |
| U.S. Response Cost | Approximately $1 billion bombing campaign in early 2025 |
| Humanitarian Crisis Scale | 21.6 million Yemenis in need of aid; 4.5 million displaced |
| Designated Terrorist Organization | Redesignated by the U.S. in January 2024 |
| Strategic Waterway Controlled | Bab el-Mandeb Strait — 16 miles wide, ~10% of global seaborne oil passes through |
Early in March, Abdul Malik al-Houthi declared in Sanaa that “our fingers are on the trigger, ready to respond at any moment should developments warrant it.” That is not the language of a retreating movement. That is the vocabulary of a movement that has done the math and chosen to hold off until better times.
Taking a step back from the cacophony of each individual missile launch and focusing on the longer arc is necessary to comprehend the Houthis. This group first appeared in the northern Yemeni mountains in the early 1990s, developed into a significant insurgent force over decades of conflict with a Sunni-led government, and then accomplished something that shocked nearly everyone in 2014: they entered and captured Sanaa, the capital of Yemen.
When the coalition led by Saudi Arabia began its air campaign in 2015, it anticipated a swift reversal. The Houthis still control Sanaa and the majority of northern Yemen more than ten years later.
This group has learned to punch well above its weight class, as the Red Sea campaign demonstrated, starting in late 2023 when they began hijacking and attacking commercial vessels. Their drones and missiles are cheap. The cost of rerouting international cargo ships around southern Africa and Western naval interceptions is extremely high.
UN Trade and Development statistics show that arrivals at the Cape of Good Hope port increased by 89 percent in 2024 alone. Without being informed that a militia in Yemen had become a significant factor in global inflation, consumers in North America and Europe silently absorbed higher prices for imported goods.
From the outside, it’s difficult to ignore the fact that the Houthis have essentially used the Red Sea as a lever. It doesn’t require continuous use in order to function. Behavior is altered just by the threat. Bab el-Mandeb traffic fell precipitously when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in response to Israeli and American strikes.
This was not because the Houthis fired a single missile, but rather because the market had already learned what happens when they do. During a ceasefire, the psychological leverage that was developed over the course of eighteen months of actual attacks does not vanish.
Earlier in 2025, the Trump administration launched a bombing campaign that cost almost $1 billion. A ceasefire was declared at the end of the weeks-long conflict, which made major headlines. Two more ships were then sunk by the Houthis. There is a pattern here that should be taken seriously: military force has weakened Houthi capabilities on the periphery without destroying the political will or underlying infrastructure.
A similar story is told by the trenches and fortifications that are allegedly growing around Hodeidah, Yemen’s principal port city in the west. These are not the actions of a militia getting ready to negotiate its demise. These are the actions of someone getting ready for the next round.
It is hard to overstate how structurally vulnerable all of this is due to the Iran dimension. Although the Houthis continue to have true operational autonomy, their Red Sea campaign has historically coincided with more general Iranian strategic choices. Tehran may be purposefully keeping the Houthi card in reserve, according to senior analysts at the Royal United Services Institute in London.
This pressure valve could be opened at any time, not just when the Houthis want it. Unpredictability is increased by internal divisions within the movement. According to reports, hardliners want to escalate right away. Some contend that securing Yemeni territory is more important at this time. Because it makes it impossible for outside observers to predict what will happen next, that internal tension is a risk factor in and of itself.
Even in the absence of a single new attack, the economic stakes in 2026 are subtly high. Rerouting shipping companies around Africa resulted in significant fuel costs and weeks-long transit times. When the Red Sea subsided, those expenses didn’t go away; instead, they were incorporated into supply chain choices, pricing schemes, and insurance plans that will take years to fully resolve.
All of that suffering would be immediately reset by a new campaign, especially if it were sparked by a conflict between the United States and Iran. Major insurers’ risk models now permanently account for a Houthi escalation scenario in ways they did not prior to October 2023, and they have not forgotten what happened to premiums in 2024.
It’s still unclear if the relative calm in the Red Sea is a result of Iranian sequencing calculations or strategic discipline on the part of the Houthis. The structural incentives for new disruption appear to have remained unchanged. The Bab el-Mandeb is still indispensable.
It is still essential for international shipping. Attacking ships there makes headlines around the world right away and is far more expensive for Western economies and their allies than it is for the Houthis to carry out. The news cycle has changed, so that asymmetry doesn’t go away on its own.
There is no stabilization in the Red Sea. It is holding its breath. Furthermore, the slow fuse isn’t getting shorter in 2026 with unresolved Iran-US tensions, ongoing Israeli military operations, and a movement that has consistently shown it means what it says. Where most people aren’t looking, it’s just quietly burning.